| During the period when the project was sent to the countryside,rural elites participated in village governance through public projects,and project elites took advantage of the project to grab private interests and form "profit-sharing order",leading to governance Dilemma.However,in the investigation of W Village in Jiangxi Province,it was found that in the early stage of the tap water project,the rural elite DW was still committed to the public welfare goal of "high household entry rate and unified water use",turned to "negative governance" in the middle and late stage of the project,and fell into the dilemma of "one person managed for 12 years and no one took over".However,The survey on W village in Jiangxi province found that rural elite DW at the beginning of the construction of water project,in the face of villagers don’t cooperate is dedicated to "high penetration,water unification",to achieve scientific water,water saving of the public welfare goal,just turn to "negative governance" in middle and later periods of the project,and in "one management for 12 years,no one to take over the" predicament.Then,where does the philanthropic tendency of project elites come from?Why did the elite of village"public welfare" not achieve the ideal performance,but show negative governance?Under the background of national resources feeding back,villages increasingly realize village development through public projects,does it shape the new role and behavior logic of rural elites?Based on the "public welfare broker" this role for the elite,with W village tap water project as the background,through combing the elite DW in different period of the project operation system of environment and behavior strategy,in the shape of rural elite roles and discusses the action mechanism of induced,which under the background of rich theoretical resources back-feeding rural villages elite role theory.The main structure of the thesis is divided into four parts.Firstly,the institutional environment of the village where the project is run is analyzed.On the one hand,it describes the atomized social structure and weakened governance structure of the village before the project enters the village;on the other hand,it analyzes the behavior response of the village based on its own structure when the project enters the village."Public agent"in the early years of the second,the project illustrates the effect of shape,action strategies,and,according to the "implementation of the action-operation-institutional change" event development detailed comb,shows the "public agent" has caused the government project schedule pressure and stability sinking,form a new system environment.Thirdly,the transformation of elite DW’s action strategy under the constraints of the new system is presented in detail,showing the alienation process of the role of "public welfare broker".Finally,this process is summarized and considered.This paper argues that "public welfare broker" is a benign cooperative relationship between the country and the rural elites under the background of resource feedback to the rural areas,and based on the realistic dilemma of the governance task of rural development and the weakening of grassroots governance capacity.On the one hand,the rural elites participated in public projects for their personal interests and realized them;on the other hand,the country endowed them with the attribute of "public welfare" to limit the expansion of the rural elites’ "brokerage" attribute,realizing a win-win cooperation between the state and the elite.However,the partnership has been rocky.In the actual operation,it is manifested as deviation from the goal of "public welfare".Under the strong incentive of the superior government,the subsidence of the implied progress target and stability target of the project induces the phenomenon of target substitution,and the atomization of the village institutional environment also eliminates the public welfare value of the village.Based on this,"public welfare broker" has practical limitations.First,the "public welfare" attribute is not stable,easy to degenerate into "broker".Second,in the absence of the corresponding authority basis and governance resources,gradually dependent on the political elite. |