| This work addresses why developing countries engage in multilateral negotiations with stronger, developed states. Traditional power analysis and international relations theory argues that they could not expect to achieve significant gains and would like lose a great deal because the lack of power resources mean little control over outcomes. This, however, does not reflect reality. Two possible international relations theories, rational institutionalism and constructivism, present possible hypotheses to explain why developing countries participate given the large power differences. Using a case study approach, I apply hypotheses from each theory to negotiating groups, including services, intellectual property, investment measures, safeguards, subsidies/countervailing duties, antidumping and agriculture, from the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. The goal is to determine if either theory generates the best explanation for why developing countries participated and what this tells us about the role of power.; The analysis indicates developing countries participate to decrease uncertainty. This participation may be cooperative or not, depending on which will lower uncertainty. Rational institutionalism's stability hypothesis captures developing countries' need for lowered uncertainty and can explain the initial decision to participate in multilateral negotiations. The constructivist hypotheses from social processes and identity explain how the concern over uncertainty shapes developing countries' behavior during the negotiations and their attitude towards the institution while the empowerment hypothesis explains why their behavior changed over time. Each theory has value and neither can be ignored. Rational institutionalist hypotheses from stability and, to a lesser degree, information explain the decision to participate. Constructivist hypotheses explain how developing countries participated and why they became more cooperative.; The final results indicate that, even with power differences, developing countries secure gains in multilateral negotiations. Participation allows them to ally with others, exploit stronger countries' lack of will and use the organization's rules to increase their ability to control outcomes. The lack of power resources could be offset by participation. They became “middle powers” in the Uruguay Round. This allowed them to secure some gains even in issues where the developed countries were the strongest. Thus, lack of power resources does not lead to the inability to control outcomes. |
