Estimation Contributing Strategies In Threshold Public Goods Provision

We analyze a structural model of four threshold public goods provision mechanisms,where the public good is provided only if the aggregated contributions reach or surpass the predetermined cost;otherwise contributions will be returned to individuals.Based on individual contributions to a public good in multiple periods,we are able to identify the number of contributing strategies,functional form for each strategy and the transition probabilities of contributing strategies conditional on the previous provision outcomes.We apply the Hu(2008)to the experimental data we collected and show that individuals are more likely to be divided into two types under PPM and three types under PR?UPC?UPA.The contribution strategies of“low contributors”under PPM,PR and UPC are very close,and they will contribute more under the UPA;“high contributors”are significantly higher under UPA,UPC and PR than under PPM;“medium contributors”contribute more under UPC than PR.Learning transition matrixs indicate that participants tend to maintain their strategies in response to previous successes.By contrast,if goods were not provided in the previous period,they would often contribute more in the next period.In addition,different types show different learning modes,some of which tend to maintain their original strategies completely unchanged,while others change their strategics with a certain probability according to the results provided earlier.