A Game Analysis Of The Proportion Of Private Capital Shares Influences Coordinated Behavior Under The Mixed Reform Of The State-owned Enterprises

Since the 90 s of the 20 th century,the reform of state-owned enterprises has introduced multi-level principal-agent mechanism between the state and enterprises,transforming the state-owned enterprises with modern enterprise system in order to achieve the goal of separation of government and enterprise,clear rights and responsibilities,clear property rights and scientific management.But there are still excessive concentration of shares and other issues,the CPC Central Committee and State Council issued "on deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises guidance" on the development of mixed ownership economy,deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises made a very clear deployment.However,the reform of the mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises is deepening;there are still a lot of corruption,conspiracy and other acts against the interests of enterprises.How many share the private capital holdings continue to attract considerable attention from the academics,administrators and media.However a large number of empirical research results existing contradictory conclusions and there is few research in this mechanism.This paper aims to reduce the corruption and collusion of state-owned enterprises,and specifically analyzes how much the proportion of private capital in the process of "mixed reform" can be used to maximize the utility of "mixed reform".This paper innovatively established a Game Analysis Model analysis considering factors such as reputation collusion behavior,at the same time,it is based on the expansion and improvement of the incentive effect of the annual salary system,in the state-owned holding and the optimal compensation contracts,studying the effects of research in the proportion of private capital holdings and other factors on collusion behavior of managers in state-owned enterprises of private capital investment,and explains why the results of previous studies produced conflicting feature.Reasonably explained why the previous research results would lead to contradictory conclusions,and concluded that the mere introduction of individual private equity could not achieve the ultimate goal of mixed ownership reform,and that more private capital should be introduced into the stock,so that it may be better to achieve the "mixed change" goal.Here we provide evidence can bring theoretical basis and recommendations for the smooth development of the reform of state-owned enterprises.