Research On The Impact Of Separation Of Dispensing From Prescription Policy On Competitive Supply Chain Performance

With the rapid aging of population and the increasing demand for medical services in China,the drawbacks of the existing medical system are increasingly prominent.There are some thorny social problems such as the difficulty and high cost of getting medical service,excessive treatment and tense doctor-patient relationship.The main causes of these problems include the unscientific medical system and the information asymmetry between doctors and patients.Based on the background,China begins to implement the separation of dispensing from prescription(SDP)policy.While there is little research on the SDP policy,especially from the perspective of pharmaceutical supply chain.Using methods of the game theory,this paper constructs a pharmaceutical supply chain model under different medical policies and different competitive factors.This paper studies the decision-making behaviors and performance levels of pharmaceutical companies and governmental hospitals under different conditions.Firstly,in the case of price competition,we found that after the implementation of the SDP policy,(1)the expected profit of governmental hospitals increases while the expected utility of patients decreases.(2)the profit changes of pharmaceutical companies is related to the sensitivity coefficient of medications prices and the risk of market fluctuations.When the price sensitivity coefficient of medications and the risk of market fluctuation are low,the profit of pharmaceutical companies increases.When the price sensitivity coefficient of medications and the risk of market fluctuation are high,the profit of pharmaceutical companies decreases.(3)the total expenses of patients increases.(4)the number of patients entering the hospital remains unchanged,but the number of patients purchasing medications decreases.Secondly,in the case of service competition,we found that after the implementation of the SDP policy,(1)the total expenses that patients need to pay increases,and patients need to pay more if the competition for services becomes more intense.(2)the number of patients entering the hospital is related to service price competition intensity,service quality competition intensity,addition ratio and medications price.When the competition intensity of service price is high and the price of medications are low,the number of patients entering the hospital increases.When the intensity of service competition is low,the intensity of service price competition is high,the proportion of additions is large,and the price of medications is within a certain range,the number of patients entering the hospital decreases.(3)under certain conditions,the policy of SDP can improve the Pareto profit of government hospitals and pharmaceutical companies,as well as the utility of patients.Finally,in the case of simultaneous competition of prices and services,we found that after the implementation of the SDP policy,(1)the expected utility of patients decreases and the expected profit of hospitals increases.(2)the profit change of pharmaceutical companies is related to the risk of market fluctuation and the price sensitivity coefficient of medications.When the risk of market fluctuation and the price sensitivity coefficient of medications are low,the profit of pharmaceutical companies increases.When the risk of market fluctuation is high,the profit of pharmaceutical companies decreases.(3)the total expenses of patients increases.The fiercer the price competition is,the less it increases.And the fiercer the service quality competition is,the more it increases.(4)the number of patients entering the hospital remains unchanged,while the number of patients purchasing medications in the pharmaceutical supply chain decreases.(5)price competition is beneficial to reduce expenses,but it rejects the entering of some patients.Service competition is beneficial to increase the number of patients admitted to hospitals,but it increases expenses.