A Study On Technology Innovation Of Construction Enterprises Based On Evolutionary Game Theory

On the base of the characteristics of architectural technology innovation and the construction industry chain,the paper considers the influence of the linkage and interaction on the choice of innovation strategies for construction enterprises between three innovation subjects: government,construction enterprises and project proprietors,and discusses how the subjects coordinate the key factors to promote architectural technology innovation.The paper provides suggestions for the government to formulate the subsidy policy,and provides a theoretical basis for the choice of innovation strategy and the design of cooperative innovation mechanism of construction enterprises.The core content is concluded as follows:The first part establishes an evolutionary game model between a construction enterprise and government to study the influence of government R&D input subsidy and output subsidy on the technology innovation behavior of construction enterprises,and analyzes the effect of innovation success probability and the cost of speculative behavior on the system.The study finds that input subsidy is not always more effective to stimulate innovation than output subsidy.When the innovation success probability is low,the output subsidy can do well in stimulating innovation.When the probability is high enough,government should adopt input subsidy and pay attention to restrain speculative behavior at the same time.The second part studies the vertical technology-cooperation innovation between the bounded rational construction enterprise and the proprietor in engineering project on the basis of evolutionary game theory,and explores the influence of government subsidies,innovation inputs,income distribution on the evolutionary stabilization strategy.The study finds that the smooth development of vertical technology-cooperation innovation is largely dependent on the proprietor's income.And under certain conditions,the increase of government subsidies,innovation success probability and profit,and the reduction in proprietor's investment all have positive effect on the innovation.There exists optimal allocation ratio of innovation benefits and government subsidies to maximize the possibility of technology-cooperation innovation.The third part studies the evolutionary stability strategies of the horizontal technologycooperation innovation between two construction enterprises,and discusses how the key factors influence the evolutionary stability strategy.The study finds that besides the factors that may effect the vertical technology-cooperation innovation,the horizontal technologycooperation innovation is also influenced by the benefits and costs of opportunistic behavior.And reducing the opportunism benefits through reasonable control of knowledge spillovers,and increasing the opportunist behavior costs through the establishment of a perfect punishment mechanism,will help both enterprises achieve a win-win situation.