The Research Of The Interest Game And Its Countermeasures In The Land Expropriation

Now, the speed of industrialization and urbanization in China is growing faster and faster. As the benefit of economy growth has been distributed inappropriately, the issue of interest game becomes noticeable. Under the background of building socialism harmonious society and new socialism countryside, the industrialization and urbanization have brought about increasing number of land expropriation which should be responsible for more and more event of conflicts and disputes. Because land expropriation breaks the old frame of interest game down, multipartite benefit bodies fight fiercely with each other for the pursuit of new frame of interests. In the process of land expropriation, there is not only a process of interest reassembly but also a process of interest game. Nowadays, in this process, the local government has engaged with a series of researches and explorations about the efficient method to achieve fair interest distribution. However, given that faultiness of the progress of land expropriation, the standard as well as scope of compensation for land and social insurance for farmers without their own land, it can hardly be prevented for seriously illegal event which damages the relationship between the government and common people. Undoubtedly, this circumstance would be harmful to the construction of socialism harmonious society and new socialism countryside, reasonable interest to citizen is still in its infancy after series of land condemnation all over the country.In this paper, we will discuss the interest game in the land expropriation seriously. Firstly, the author elaborates on Property Right Theory, Social Conflict Theory and Game Theory. Then, based on the above theory, the writer would analyze the role and strategy of benefit bodies, and structure the model of benefit game. Secondly, in term of field work, the author would put forward the reason of benefit game, between multipartite benefit bodies, which includes indistinct land right, narrow compensation scope, and the low-level consciousness of farmer on rights-safeguarding. Thirdly, through the analysis of whole article, the following solutions to interest game in the land could be achieved. These include further clarifying the public land property right, enforcing the confirmation of farmers’right, completing the rules of social insurance for those groups, building effective mechanism to ensure reemployment of those, strengthening the supervision and management to Village Committee.