| Since1988, China has launched the construction supervision system. Construction supervision of infrastructure in China has played a huge role in promoting effective to ensure the project goals, and achieved remarkable economic and social benefits. However, with the rapid development of the industry of supervision in China, some problems have been gradually exposed, as the information asymmetry between the owners and supervision units, resulting in supervision units utilize their information advantage for personal gain on the interests of owner’s losses during the compliance process. Therefore, the establishment of an effective incentive mechanism to reduce moral hazard the unit owners suffering from supervision units is necessary. This paper from both explicit and implicit sides researches on incentive to supervision units, and focuses on the construction of a supervision services quality evaluation system to strengthen the implicit incentive to supervision units.In explicit incentive part, this paper according to the principal-agent relationship between the supervision units and the owners establishes a mathematical model, and analyzes the optimal incentive coefficient by solving the mathematical model, then use earned value method to establish the optimal incentive compensation model.In the implicit incentive part, this paper from law, market, economy and credit four sides constructs an incentive environment to regulate the market and increase competition, enhancing incentive of the supervisory units from the perspective of reputation incentive. Part in the establishment of the credit environment, this paper proposes to accelerate the establishment of an effective construction supervision service quality evaluation system, making the past service performance of supervisory units become an effective measure of evaluating credit, thereby promoting the survival of the fittest the industry of supervisory to achieve the incentive effect. |
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