| China is a developing country with the most population in the world, and rural population accounts for the vast majority of it. Therefore, the development of rural area is an important part of China’s social and economic development, and rural medical security system is as well as an important means of guarantee to improve the farmers’health and promote rural development. As a main system of rural medical security, the new rural cooperative medical system began from2003is organized, guided and supported by government, and financed by farmers, collectivities and governments. Its main purpose is to provide subsidy for severe disease. Farmers can join in the system freely. Since its implementation, the scheme has greatly improved the farmers’health and rural health care services, and alleviated widespread poverty caused by using health facilities. But at the same time, the problems such as "adverse selection","adverse subsidies" and supply-induced demand have a negative impact on system implementation performance; people begin to suspect its developing prospects.So, in order to find out the root causes of these problems, this paper analyzes the static and dynamic game-playing structures between the relevant interest groups which play a decisive role in the implementation performance of the rural cooperative medical care system by using the game-playing research instrument. Thus, it extracts the institutional factors that have influenced the medical care system and those that have influenced the stability of the balance, and then investigates the impact of different assignments of those factors on the system implementation performance, in order to improve the performance through changing those institutional factors. The whole paper is divided into six chapters. Chapter1is the preface, the background and meaning of topic chosen, the related concept definition, research methods and main content. Chapter2is the review of former research, first introduces the two normal methods of evaluating the new rural cooperative medical care’s performance, and second summarizes the literature that researches the new rural cooperative medical care using game-playing method, third generalizes the foreign research in this area. Chapter3introduces the new rural cooperative medical care scheme and its current performance in general. Chapter4analyzes the behavioral characteristics of the relevant interest groups in the system, lays the foundation for the following game analysis. Chapter5makes a game-playing analysis of the system. Chapter6shows the main findings of this paper, and proposes corresponding policies and proposals from the point of view of different relevant interest groups... |