Research On Board Of Supervisors System Of The State-owned Commerical Banks

Frequent occurrences of major financial cases in state-owned commercial banks indicate that the immune system of state-owned commercial banks is not perfect and there are serious defects in the internal supervision mechanisms. As Montesquieu says, "All the people who have power will abuse power easily, which is a constant and eternal experience. To prevent abuse of power, it must be restricted with power.''The core of bank's internal supervision mechanism is the Board of Supervisors. Owing to the influences of concepts, institution and other factors, the Board of Supervisors system of state-owned commercial banks fails to play its proper value effect, and even leads to the phenomenon that the Board of Supervisors is nearly nominal, which obviously can not meet the requirements to develop China's socialist market economy and establish the modern enterprise system. Studying the Board of Supervisors system of the state-owned commercial banks, improving the supervisory system, reconstructing the supervisory functions of the Board of Supervisors are the practical needs to curb the corruption of bank executives. Strengthening the independence and importance of the Board of Supervisors through institutional reform in various aspects to create a good atmosphere and continuously optimize the balance of power in company systems helps to enhance the competitiveness and image of the state-owned commercial banks.As the study of the Board of Supervisors of the state-owned commercial banks is in a small scope, this article intends to do the research from two points, that is, the state-owned commercial banks and the system of the Board of Supervisors. This study relates to the integration of some relevant perspectives and systems, and tries to build the system wholly of Board of supervisors of state-owned commercial banks. By the idea of raising, analyzing and solving problems, this paper will research the systems of the Board of Supervisors on state-owned commercial banks, using empirical, comparative, systematic, and value-analyzing methods. The focus of this study is to propose appropriate measures to reconstruct the systems of the Board of supervisors on state-owned commercial banks in theory, by combining the current situation of the Board of supervisors on our domestic state-owned commercial banks and the experience of Board of supervisors abroad. The difficulty of this research is how to give the Board of Supervisors an independent status and the effective regulatory powers. The innovative point lies in taking the Board of Supervisors as the center to rationalize the relationship between internal governance bodies of state-owned commercial banks.Firstly, this article introduces the basic profiles of the Board of Supervisors in China's commercial banks, and then does a further research on the theoretical foundation and practical basis to establish the Board of Supervisors of state-owned commercial banks. Secondly, this paper analyzes the operational status of the Board of Supervisors of state-owned commercial banks and explores the reasons for the inefficient running of the Board of Supervisors. Thirdly, this thesis proposes the principles and institutional environment in theory to reconstruct the operating systems for the Board of Supervisors of state-owned commercial banks, and tries to rationalize the relationship between the Board of Supervisors and the other internal governance bodies of the state-owned commercial banks. Finally, aiming at the problems exposed from the Board of Supervisors, this article puts forward that reconstructing the Board of Supervisors should start from the following aspects: solving the problem that the state-owned commercial banks keep its exclusively dominant position, establishing the independent status for the Board of Supervisors, conferring the Board of Supervisors substantive supervisory power, innovating new ways of supervising, introducing the systems that strategic investors delegate supervisors, reconstructing the institution of assigning supervisors, establishing the performance evaluation mechanism of the Board of Supervisors.