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The Integration Government Mechanism Study On Moral Hazard Of Medical Service Supplier In Medical Insurance

Posted on:2012-04-12Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:M CaiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2214330368491816Subject:Social security
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The essence of medical insurance is providing purchasing power to insured. But, the moral hazard of the supplier makes a dent in capability of the medical insurance in social security. So many former policies dealing with moral hazard was working on the encouragement and restrain of the Payment mechanism, while this could not enforce interest compatible within both sides. Root cause is that they haven't deep know with the production mechanism of the moral hazard.In this paper, incomplete contract theory, the division of the network and the integration of governance theory, built up a contractual relationship model. The moral hazard will avoid through the contractual relationship governance. Then Trying to deepen the division of labor and conclude the contract of interests integration to optimize a new governance structure, to avoid the moral hazard.Finally, from the experience in integration of governance abroad and china, come to that avoiding moral hazard should be put down in the big three network environment. Through the integration of the health insurance fund system and the health care delivery system to form an integrated system - Health care delivery network. Health insurance plays a control functions in purchasing power in the system, to constraints residual claim on the medical side. This is also the current pilot of the " Three medical linkage" Thoughts consistent.
Keywords/Search Tags:moral hazard, the integration of governance, professional division of labor, HMO, Ruijin Hospital Group
PDF Full Text Request
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