The Research Of M&A And Restructure Performance Of Fangda Carbon

In the turbulent wave of global mergers and acquisitions, whether M&A and restructure can really improve performance and promote value has become a hot topic in theory and practice industry. M&A and restructure are very complex, because scholars often research different samples in different methods, theoretical research on this issue has not yet reached consensus. For this reason, this article selected the Fangda carbon as a typical case in order to evaluate their performance of M&A and restructure, and explores the main factors which influence the performance of M&A and restructure. The article tries to contribute to the theory research and practice of the M&A and restructure performance for the future, especially to provide a valuable reference method for M & A case studies.In this paper, we review the theories of M&A and restructure and methods of M&A performance evaluation firstly. Then we use the EVA method to assess the M&A performance, and conclude that M&A and restructure improve Fangda carbon operating performance indeed. Finally, we build up the hierarchy structure of the main factors of Fangda Carbon M&A performance, and found that the contribution of corporate strategy for their performance far exceeds other three factors, and the contribution of corporate finance is the smallest. After we analyze the contribution of the next level indicators to performance, we found that the strategic objectives, strategic implementation and control, the controlling shareholder behavior and the environment are the four factors of the greatest contribution, the smallest contribution factors are debt financing policies and the governance of supervisor board. The conclusions of this paper not only verified the perspective of management theory on the company strategy, but also confirmed that the transfer of control can improve the performance of listed companies by the replacement of executives and board members particularly when state-owned companies to be privatized. And this also provides another testimony for corporate governance in the board of supervisors of China's listed companies playing an unimportant role.