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The Mathematical Research On Incentive Mechanism Of Executive Stock Option

Posted on:2008-10-29Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X Q ZhaoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360218453028Subject:Probability theory and mathematical statistics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the deepening reform of enterprises and establishment of market economy, separated ownership from the management power is already a obvious feature of enterprises management, how to seek a scientific and effective mechanism is becoming an urgent issue to be resolved. On the basic of the concept and relevant theories of Executive Stock Option (ESO), at the same time basing on the risk bias, we determine an effect function of the manager, then using the equal model determined and the effect function chosen, we respectively discuss the economy measure value of the ESO having the fixed maturity and random life, where price variation of underlying asset obeys geometry Brown motion and jump-diffuse process. Secondly, analyses the practice of the ESO in a large length of the thesis according to the double-branch tree of two orders selected and the two factors of the action and the nature deciding the result. We build up a balanced and contractual model to get a superior share of the ESO between the stockholder and the manager and the compose of act strategy of the manager, and it makes their initial income maximum.Last part analyses some typical models respectively and entirely and gives their economic costs to the stockholder, which purpose is to provide some helpful, illumination and inspiration for further popularizing and perfecting the ESO program, and to establish a model which is well served anywhere at any time for enterprise.
Keywords/Search Tags:ESO, Principal-agent, Value-cost, Incentive-restriction, Residual claim
PDF Full Text Request
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