Government's Income-tax Regulations And Incentive In Corporate Governance

The government' s income-tax regulations, as measures to control enterprises, are the outer institutional variables and external incentive for state-owned enterprises and will produce significant effects on corporate governance and enterprises' performance. It is a hard nut to settle the relations between government and state-owned enterprises for economists. Is there the necessity for state-owned economy exist? Is there an optimal rate for state-owned economy? How does the state-owned economy rate as the external incentive affect the internal incentive of corporate governance? How to reply the questions above is important for state-owned economy reform. Consequently, it is necessary to deepen the analysis and discuss systematically as to the game relations in different stages between government, the nominal owner of state-owned enterprises, and state-owned enterprises.On the basis of domestic and international relevant researches, this paper analyzes the interrelation between government' s income-tax regulations, the external incentive, and corporate governance from theoretical and experiential perspectives, and set the analysis on the bases of the frame of a history look-back government-enterprise income-tax regulation game model. The frame lays emphases on a analysis of government-enterprise micro game mechanism and put forward a low efficiency of state-owned enterprises under regulations as the conclusion. After the analysis of the frame, this paper try designing a new regulation mechanism.This paper divides into five parts altogether.The first part is foreword. It summarizes and recommends the incentive nature of government' s income-tax regulation as the external incentive, domestic and international researches on state-owned enterprises' efficiency, and the research train of thought and frame of this paper.The second part is the research basis of this paper. Firstly , this part introduce the government-enterprise income-tax regulation model and its conclusion. Then, a experiential analysis and explanation areconducted combined with domestic and international researches.The third part is the study of the optimal rate of state-owned economy. That is to say, is there a convergence boundary for state-owned economy? As the incentive of corporate governance, how to allocate residual claims and residual control is important.The forth part is based on the three preceding parts. This part try giving a solution under stable expectation through the government regulation mechanism design of converting stock rights to obligatory rights.The fifth part is the concluding remarks. It synthesizes the researches, conclusions and limitation of research of this paper, and put forth the questions need studying further.