An Extended Model Of Prisoners' Dilemma

Economists and sociologists are always trying to reveal the fundamental factors that contribute to cooperation and collision. The Game Theory provides a new way in which researchers could use the accurately mathematic tools to analyze realistic problems. At present, Game Theory has almost infiltrated into all social science domains, which has become an important part of dominate economics and has generated significant impacts in economic theory and methods. Interactive behaviors among human beings can be reconstituted by Game Theory, which actually is a non-cooperative game includes benefits mixed with cooperation and collision. Prisoners'Dilemma is a representative case of non-cooperative game, which reflects individual rationalities do not necessarily mean collective rationality. Although it is a theoretic model, Prisoners'Dilemma corresponds to the real life perfectly. This paper attempts to expand the classical prisoners'dilemma model. Sorting by the personal and public cost and benefit types, I shall construct four new types of the original model to show the strategic meaning of the game theory and to show the real reason why players decide to work or not. By using this model, this paper will analyze the new rural medical scheme as an example.China started the new rural medical scheme from 2003, which is an elementary insurance institute of rural area. It concerns a lot of subjects and complicated things and determines the rural population health. It is vital to rural human resources and agricultural production. This paper uses extended model of prisoners'dilemma to study the complex relationships in new rural medical scheme and construct the game models of between central and local governments, among local governments, between local governments and peasants and between government and medical institutes. The central and local governments are on an even end in the game, but the superior governments intend to enforce their duties on the inferior ones; peasants are dominated in the game yet are able to gain benefits by non-participation, excessive utilization and even cheating; the medical institutes are lured to collies to overuse public medical resource. In order to solve the dilemma, we must enhance the relative legislation, clarify the duties among different governments, strengthen the administration on the scheme and the appointed medical institutes and optimize the medical service quality etc.