The Analysis Of Physician-patient Relationship Based On Asymmetrical Information

With the continuous development of economy and deepening process of reform and opening in China, the abuse of physician-patient relationship formatted under the planned economy has been exposed gradually. Today reform in health care system of China is turning towards the direction of marketing system. While in this system, hospitals and doctors as the direct medical treatment suppliers, together with patients as the medical treatment demanders, constitute a relationship of supply and demand for medical service. The most outstanding characteristics in physician-patient relationship is the presence of information asymmetry between hospitals and patients, which directly lead to inefficiency in the health cure market. This issue just becomes the topic of this thesis, i.e., an analysis of physician-patient relationship based on information asymmetry.This thesis discusses the connotation and reason of physician-patient information asymmetry. And then it studies the problem of ex ante and ex post information asymmetry respectively, according to the occurring time of information asymmetry. First, this thesis considers the problem of adverse selection caused by ex ante information asymmetry and how to reach separate equilibrium by sending out signal. What's more, it reveals a kind of special adverse selection, i.e., going to big hospital for common illness in China through a model of dynamic game which has unfixed players. Then, this thesis analyzes moral hazard caused by ex post information asymmetry. In this part, we explain the low efficiency because of physician-patient information asymmetry by a comparison between the static and dynamic state principal-agent model. We also try to weaken the information asymmetry through the repute model of the agent market. In the end of this thesis, we summarize some foreign experience on how to solve the problem of physician-patient information asymmetry, and put forward some policy suggestions according to our realities.The theme of this thesis is quite practical and has a definite standpoint. As respect to the research method, we indicate the effect and resolvent of physician-patient information asymmetry by a long-term dynamic game model which takes hospitals, physicians and patients as game players. It strengthens the strictness and persuasion of the article and it at the same time becomes an innovation of this thesis.