On Healthcare Pricing And The Subsidy Coordination Mechanism Considering Patient Sensitivity Preference

Healthcare service is a basic public service to ensure the survival and development needs of all citizens and to meet the level of economic and social development.At present,the heath care service system is not perfect,there are still many systemic problems of medical service for patients,for example,excessive demand,the difficulty situation that some patients are unable to seek medical treatment due to economic difficulties,the uncertainty effect of the information platform optimization on the patient’s selected preference,the difficulties of the patient’s sharing of self-health data,the mechanism of the epidemic prevention’s resource allocation.These systematic healthcare service problems significantly affect the utilization efficiency and benefit of healthcare resources.Considering patients rational line selection around sensitive patient preference,this paper determine the reasonable price of healthcare service,build a scientific and rational medical service benefits coordination mechanism,analyze the impact of the optimizing information platform on the patients in choosing healthcare service,explore the incentive problems of patients shared self health data,improve on healthcare pricing and the subsidy coordination mechanism,and test the mechanism of healthcare pricing and subsidy coordination in the course of regular epidemic prevention.The main research contents and findings of this paper are as follows:(1)Medical service pricing contributes to the efficiency of the medical service system.The government can make medical resources serve patients by adjusting medical service price.If the government health budget cap is adequate,then the government should pay more attention to the welfare of patients.Under the medical service pricing policy,the waiting time and price decrease with the increase of market demand.If the patient’s waiting cost is low,the free policy is better.(2)Medical service subsidy can reduce the burden of patients’ medical expenses.When patients’ waiting sensitivity was moderate or treatment complexity was moderate,patients’ out-of-pocket payments and additional benefits for poor patients reached the maximum.Compared with the situation of unequal medical services,medical service subsidy can not only reduce the out-of-pocket pressure brought by the medical cost-sharing system to poor patients,but also generally reduce the out-of-pocket pressure of ordinary patients.(3)Information platform optimization will not have a negative impact on patients’ medical burden.For public hospitals,the optimal input of information platform optimization will not affect patients’ out-of-pocket payments.When the medical needs of patients increase,the budget allocated to public hospitals decreases.In the information platform optimization scenario,there is no correlation between the medical expenses borne by patients and the medical service project costs.(4)Patients’ participation in incentive subsidies can improve the universality of medical services.For non-emergency conditions,patient participation incentive grants allow more potential patients to participate in medical services.The coverage of medical service can be improved by subsidizing medical service projects with low medical service capacity but high incentive subsidy efficiency.(5)The coordination mechanism of medical service pricing and subsidy considering patients’ sensitive preferences can be applied to a wider range of medical and health fields.If the scale of population flow is controlled within a certain range,the epidemic spread by aerosol can be effectively controlled on the basis of certain medical resources.Vaccination rates above a certain level can ensure that the overall regional infection rate is controlled to a low degree.