| The deep integration of next-generation information and communication technology with the manufacturing industry,retail service industry and resource recycling industry,which promotes the rapid development and implementation of the E-closed-loop supply chain(E-CLSC)as the core of the e-commerce platform(referred to the platform).It has a huge impact and influence on the product sales,recycling operation and coordination of the closed-loop supply chain.Rapidly developing platform-leading E-CLSC breakthroughs limit of space and time of products trading,expands the manufacturer's product sales and recycling channel & mode,and changes the attributes of consumers' behavior and the internal power structure of the closedloop supply chain,which makes the members' relationship in the closed-loop supply chain more complex and the conflict of interest more intensified,leading to the overall inefficiency of E-CLSC.Practice has proved that reasonable and effective recycling channel,sales mode and coordination mechanism of interest are the key to improve the operation effect of E-CLSC.Therefore,combining consumption demand of the product and the analysis of enterprises' equilibrium strategies,how to choose the optimal recycling channel,sales mode and to design effective coordination mechanism of contract becomes an urgent problem to be solved.The dissertation takes the platform-led E-CLSC as the research object and considers the difference in the effectiveness of the recycling subject green activity project(GAP)through the theory of consumer behavior,game theory and contract economics.Based on the analysis of the structure and functional relationship of the elements of competition and cooperation between the manufacturer and the ecommerce platform,the corresponding game decision models are built for different recycling channels,sales models and decision forms of platform-led E-CLSC,combining with equilibrium strategies analysis and member profits comparison,which studies the design of the optimal recycling channel,sales mode and coordination mechanism of the platform-led E-CLSC.The main research contents of this dissertation are as follows:1.Optimal recycling channel design of platform-led E-CLSC in the consignment mode.By analyzing the operation structure and interest relationship of E-CLSC in the consignment mode,different decision models of recycling organizations are established respectively which include the manufacturer,the e-commerce platform and the thirdparty recycler.Through the comparative analysis of E-CLSC equilibrium strategies and members' profits,the research reveals the influence rules of the structure of recycling channel and the effectiveness of recycling organizations' GAP on equilibrium strategies and members' profits.The research has shown that:(1)The logistics service level of the manufacturer,the level of GAP comprehensive index and members' profits are improved with the increase of the effectiveness of GAP of the recycling organizations.(2)In the recycling decision model of the e-commerce platform,unit product sales commission decreases with the increase of recycling transfer price of the waste product;In the recycling decision model of the manufacturer and the third party recycle,the unit product sales commission has nothing to do with the transfer price of the waste product,but increases with the increase of consumers' preference for consignment mode.(3)If the effectiveness of the GAP of recycling organizations is the same,the manufacturer's recycling is optimal in any perspective.(4)If the effectiveness of the GAP of recycling organizations is different,the optimal recycling channel is significantly affected by the GAP effectiveness of recycling organizations.2.Optimal recycling channel design of platform-led E-CLSC in wholesale mode.By analyzing the operation structure and interest relationship of E-CLSC in the wholesale mode,different decision models of recycling organizations are established respectively which include the manufacturer,the e-commerce platform and the thirdparty recycler.Through the comparative analysis of E-CLSC equilibrium strategies and members' profits,the research reveals the influence rules of the structure of recycling channel and the effectiveness of recycling organizations' GAP on equilibrium strategies and members' profits.The research has shown that:(1)The logistics service level of the e-commerce platform,the level of GAP comprehensive index and members' profits are improved with the increase of the effectiveness of GAP of the recycling organizations.(2)In the recycling decision model of the e-commerce platform,the wholesale price of the product increases synchronously with the recycling transfer price of the waste product.In the recycling decision model of the manufacturer and the third party recycle,the wholesale price has nothing to do with the transfer price of the waste product,but decreases with the increase of GAP efficiency of recycling organizations.(3)If the effectiveness of the GAP of recycling organizations is the same,the manufacturer's recycling is optimal in any perspective.(4)If the effectiveness of the GAP of recycling organizations is different,the optimal recycling channel is significantly affected by the GAP effectiveness of recycling organizations.3.Optimal sales mode selection of platform-led E-CLSC under different recycling channels.Through the comparative analysis of E-CLSC equilibrium strategies and members' profits,the research explores consumers' preference degree for product sales mode,and the law of influence on the product sales mode selection for the difference of cost elasticity coefficient of logistics service level between the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform.The research has shown that:(1)If the consumers' preference for product sales mode and the cost elasticity coefficient of logistics service level of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform are the same,the consignment mode is optimal,independent of the recycling channel.(2)If consumers have the same preference for product sales mode,but the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform have different cost elasticity coefficients of logistics service level,then there is a conflict zone in the selection of the optimal product sales mode from the perspective of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform,and the conflict zone decreases with the increase of utility elasticity coefficient of logistics service level.(3)If consumers have different preferences for product sales mode and the cost elasticity coefficient of logistics service level of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform is the same,then there is a conflict zone in the selection of optimal product sales mode from the perspective of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform,and the conflict zone expand with the increase of the utility elasticity coefficient of logistics service level.4.Design of platform-led E-CLSC coordination mechanism under different product trading scenarios.According to the different centralized channels of product sales and recovery,the reverse centralized decision model,forward centralized decision model and integrated centralized decision model are constructed.The difference of equilibrium strategies and system profit of E-CLSC under centralized decision and decentralized decision are explored respectively.The research has shown that:(1)Reverse centralized decision can't improve the profit of E-CLSC.Under certain conditions,forward centralized decision can improve the profit of E-CLSC,while integrated centralized decision can maximize the profit of E-CLSC and consumers' utility.(2)Combined with the recycling transfer price of the waste product,a reasonable and effective revenue-sharing combination contract and a two-part charging combination contract were designed,which realized the Pareto improvement of the profits of E-CLSC members.The theoretical and practical value of the research is embodied in three aspects:firstly,according to the change of consumer behavior attribute characteristics in the ecommerce environment,the consumer utility function composed of the preference degree of consumer product sales mode,product sales price and logistics service level is constructed.For different operation structures and forms of E-CLSC,six decision models are established,and the best applicable scenarios of each model are obtained.Secondly,using the optimization theory and computer simulation method,the research reveals the law of influence on E-CLSC equilibrium strategies and members' profits for effectiveness of GAP of recycling organizations and cost elasticity coefficient of logistics service level of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform.Thirdly,in order to eliminate the “double marginal utility” of E-CLSC,a kind of coordination mechanism of combination contract is designed,which provides a scientific basis for enterprises to formulate equilibrium strategies and improve profits. |
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