THE MANAGEMENT OF PEACE-MAKING IN EGYPT AND ISRAEL, 1977-79

This dissertation seeks to incorporate a narrative of diplomatic events and negotiations surrounding the "Camp David Process" with an analysis of environmental factors constricting policy-decisions made in Cairo and Jerusalem. Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin were able to successfully steward their nation's policies toward approval of a peace treaty in large measure due to extraordinary capacities for mastering techniques of intra-elite bargaining.;Egyptian Vice-President Mubarak emerged in the aftermath of Sadat's glittering Jerusalem visit as a leader in the anti-peace movement. Mubarak's lead in the military-security establishment and alliance with members of the diplomatic corps enabled effective support for traditional Arab positions to grow within Cairo's hierarchy of elites. Sadat's maneuverability lessened and he began to orchestrate a very private and complicated agenda to structure peace with Israel. The Egyptian President manipulated symbols, shifted personnel, shattered treaty opposition, resurrected ties to the army, rural and urban middle classes as well as repaired decaying relations with Cairo's poor. The result was a more independent and self-assured peace program that led to Camp David and in time signature of an Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.;Camp David however was the rubicon for Menachem Begin. The Israeli Prime Minister accepted a formula for settlements removal in the Sinai to save peace. The moderate wing of Begin's cabinet was joyous. Those ministers and parliamentarians of the right were aghast. Epithets were hurled at Begin from among several constituencies and Israel was a divided nation in the fall of 1978. The remaining months before signature of the peace treaty in March 1979 witnessed Begin's attempt to modulate the vitrolic behavior of protagonists while managing a peace that would retain some semblance of security for Israel.;Manipulation of elite behavior was conducted by Sadat and Begin against the backdrop of American Government intervention. Jimmy Carter's decision to broker a peace agreement in the Middle East often complicated the parties separate agendas for resolving diplomatic impasse. Yet in the end both Egypt and Israel would credit the White House as a singularly important influence in achieving treaty success.