Cooperation and information theoretic security in wireless networks

This dissertation studies the fundamental rate limits of wireless communication systems through which confidential messages can be transmitted without being intercepted by an adversary. It is assumed that the adversary is subject to noise and interference, as are the legitimate nodes in the system. The security guarantees offered are irrespective of the computational power of the adversary.;Three themes are developed in parallel throughout the dissertation. The first theme explores the relationship between cooperation and secrecy. In wireless networks, cooperation from intermediate relay nodes are essential for facilitating long range communications. This dissertation considers a series of network models where the information from a source to a destination needs to be kept confidential from intermediate relays. Four different network models with untrusted relay nodes are considered: the three-node relay channel, the two-hop link, the two-way relay channel and the multi-hop line network. These models are studied for relays that are honest but curious. That is, the relay nodes are legitimate nodes with lower security clearance, that willingly carry out the designated relay schemes. Secrecy capacity lower and upper bounds for each channel model are found and cases where secrecy capacity can be found are identified. Next the two-hop link is studied where the relay turns malicious in that it can manipulate the signals being relayed and carry out a Byzantine attack. In this case, two requirements must be satisfied simultaneously: The message must be kept confidential from the relay node, and, any modification carried out by the relay node must be detected reliably by the legitimate parties. The dissertation shows that both requirements can be fulfilled for this model with arbitrarily small overhead.;The next two themes developed in this dissertation serve as the technical foundation for the first theme. One establishes the foundation for providing secrecy using structured codes. Traditionally, the achievability proofs for information theoretic secrecy rely on Shannon's random codebook generation argument in which the codebook does not exhibit structure. In this dissertation, it is shown that by imposing structure requirements in random codebook generation, higher rates for secure communication can be achieved than known results obtained using the conventional approach. This dissertation develops the necessary tool and general methodology for computing the secrecy rate when a nested lattice structure is used in codebook generation. Two results are presented that rely on this foundation. First, it is proved that, for a class of Gaussian channel models with interference and secrecy constraints, structured codes outperform Gaussian signaling at medium to high SNR. Second, this tool is used to develop a strong secrecy scheme for the two-hop link with an untrusted relay, which in turn is the centerpiece of the Byzantine detection scheme developed in this dissertation.;The third theme is methods of proving strong secrecy. Information theoretic secrecy results often rely on the weak secrecy constraint which provides only asymptotic guarantees with respect to the information rate leaked to the adversary. As this would likely be insufficient in a practical system, a non-asymptotic, strong secrecy guarantee must be sought. More often than not, weak secrecy rates can be strengthened to strong secrecy rates in a straightforward manner, leading back to the justification of proving weak secrecy only. This dissertation challenges this conventional wisdom and identifies two cases where this approach does not follow. In both cases, direct strong secrecy proofs are established. These are: the two-hop link with a Byzantine relay, and models with arbitrarily varying eavesdropper channel considered in the last chapter of this dissertation.;The latter model is motivated by the need to bring the theory of providing unconditional secrecy guarantees closer to practice. In particular, the dissertation addresses the case where the channel that the adversary (eavesdropper) experiences is completely unknown to the legitimate parties. To do so, a multiple input-multiple output (MIMO) wiretap channel is considered where the eavesdropper's channel is arbitrarily varying. A coding theorem is derived for with this setting. The secrecy rate obtained from this coding theorem is tight in terms of secure degree of freedom, which is a high SNR characterization of the secrecy capacity. In addition, the secure degree of freedom regions for the MIMO multiple access (MAC) wiretap channel and the MIMO broadcast wiretap channel are derived when the legitimate nodes have the same number of antennas, identifying the high SNR characterization of the fundamental transmission limits for these models.