The Reform Of The Mixed Ownership Of State-owned Enterprises In China:Motivation,Restriction And Path

In 2017,the general office of the State Council of China issued two policy documents on the reform of the mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises,including the “Guidance on further improvement of State-owned Enterprises Governance Structure” and “the SASAC of the State Council about the plan to promote the transformation of functions by focusing on capital management”.This marks Chinese government's continuing high emphasis on the reform of the mixed ownership of stateowned enterprises.As the main body of China's national economy,the success or failure of the reform of state-owned enterprises is crucial to the sustainable development of China's economy and even related to whether China can cross "the middle-income trap".The mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises in China is not only a problem that China's economic growth has to face,but also an important way to construct the Chinese characteristic socialism society.Therefore,this paper has important theoretical and practical significance to the research on the problems related to the reform of the mixed ownership system of the state-owned enterprises.This article is about the theoretical and empirical analysis on the motive ? restriction and path of the reform of the mixed ownership of the state-owned enterprise,which provides a theoretical framework and some analytical methods for interpreting and simulating the internal and external dynamics,internal mechanism and influencing factors of the reform of the mixed ownership system of state-owned enterprises in China.Based on the theory of socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics,neoclassical economic theory and the theory of new institutional economics,the paper establishes sets up a theoretical analysis model on the motivation,restriction and path of the reform of the mixed ownership system of state-owned enterprises by using the classic economics analysis tool such as Marginal analysis,oligopoly game and equilibrium analysis and the economic frontier analysis tool such as an econometric analysis.Then it validates the theoretical model with actual data in China's economic development,which makes a comprehensive analysis of the influencing factors of the reform of the mixed ownership of the state-owned enterprise.Especially through the application of the economic frontier analysis methods such as econometric regression and dynamic simulation,the article combines the traditional problems of the reform of the mixed ownership of the state-owned enterprises and the modern economic frontiers thoughts and integrates construction of the socialist market economy system,reform of state owned enterprises and economic growth together,so as to innovate and explore the existing theory of the reform of the mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises,and also provide some practical guidance for the reform of the mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises in China.Specifically,the thesis mainly includes five parts:The first part includes the 1~3 chapters of the thesis,which is the theoretical basis and realistic basis of the thesis.In this part,it describes the background and reason,research of the structure and ideas,theoretical meaning and practical significance firstly;then reviews the basic theory and research status about the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises both at home and abroad,especially reviews the research results about the mechanism,motivation and restriction of the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises;in the final,it analysis the development course and status of Chinese mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises,and summarized the characteristics and the main problems of Chinese mixed ownership reform of stateowned enterprises.The second part is the fourth chapter of the thesis,which is based on the theoretical model and empirical analysis of the frontier economic theory.Firstly,it analyzed the reasons of the mixed ownership reform of the existing state-owned enterprises.And then,the thesis applied economic frontier analysis method to constructing an investment analysis model of state-owned enterprises under the assumption of investment-led growth.The thesis used econometric methods and Stata tools,with economic statistics of 31 China provinces(autonomous regions and municipalities)from 2007 to 2013,to verify the correctness of the theoretical model and basic conclusion.In particularly,the thesis empirically analyses the relationship between the regional economic growth and the proportion of the reform of Chinese state-owned enterprises.Finally,the thesis systematically analyzes the motives of the mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises.The third part is the fifth chapter of the thesis.The theoretical model and empirical analysis of this part is based on the Neoclassical Theory.This part used marginal analysis and equilibrium thought as the main analysis methods,and applied the two sectors static equilibrium model to theoretical research and empirical analysis on the threshold value of the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises in China.The fourth part is the sixth chapter of the thesis.The theoretical model and empirical analysis of this part is based on the game theory research method.Firstly,it analyzes the existing research results of mixed ownership reform path of state-owned enterprises,and then builds a duopoly competition model and the evolution model of social capital structure on the basis of the analysis.After that,the thesis established respectively the linear fitting relationship between market share,capital appreciation rate and proportion of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises by using the relevant data of the Chinese statistical yearbook,which verified the correctness of the theoretical model and its conclusion.In particular,the thesis empirically analyses the conclusion that the reform of the mixed ownership system will start when the proportion of the state-owned enterprise capital in social capital reaching the model feedback value.The fifth part is the seventh chapter of the thesis,which is the end and summary part of the full text.This part draws the main conclusions of the paper,and accordingly proposes a series of strategies and policy suggestions to promote the reform of the mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises in China.This study found that:(1)The reform of the mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises in China has entered the deep-water area.It has been difficult to carry out the reform of state-owned enterprises in the industry of administrative monopoly or natural monopoly.However,the trend of reform is irreversible,and the reform of the competitive and noncompetitive industry based on different categories is also imperative.However,the reform of the mixed ownership system is different from the property right reform of the state-owned enterprises withdrawing out of the market,which is more important to improve their own efficiency of the state-owned enterprises.(2)The mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises is affected by both positive and reverse power.The positive driving force includes the improvement of state-owned enterprise efficiency,economic growth and the maximization of government interests,and reverse power includes economic stability,loss aversion and social interest maximization.With the continuous deepening of the game by the market subject,the maximization of the interests of the owners of the state-owned enterprises is the ultimate driving force of the reform of the mixed ownership of the state-owned enterprises.(3)Restricted by economic growth and social stability,the reasonable proportions of the reform of the mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises has a lower limit and upper limit under the established reform conditions.The lower limit is determined by the pressure of economic growth,and the upper limit is determined by social stability constraints.The final proportion of the reform of the mixed ownership of the state-owned enterprises will tend to a balanced value that meets the constraints of the maximization of the social interests.(4)After the reform of state-owned enterprises reached the balance of Cournot Nash,the transformation of the reform path of the state-owned enterprises is bound to be carried out in China.In theory,the reform of state-owned enterprises will be deepened,and the proportion of the reform of stateowned capital will follow an irregular curve to a stable value.The social capital structure composed of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises will eventually achieve an equilibrium value,and the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises will enter the state of dynamic equilibrium.