Research On Cooperative Behavior Of Public Goods Game Experiment Under Leading-following Mechanism

From the ancient times,people have no choice but to cooperate with each other to survive in the cruel living environment,and now in the Internet age the global cooperation is still one of the major problems that people will always be faced.In social dilemma,cooperation could bring benefits to the group,but a single person's self-interested decisions usually lead to tragedy result of the group,which reflects the conflict between individual rationality and collective rationality.Economics,philosophy,psychology,evolutionary biology and many other subjects have made rich researches on social dilemmas,exploring the possibility of getting out of the dilemma,but most of the research is based on the hypothesis level,no consensus has been reached yet.The research of economic cooperation is based on the non-cooperative game.Early research emphasizes the key influence of system or governance mechanism on cooperation.With the maturity of evolutionary economics and experimental economics,direct reciprocity,indirect reciprocity,group selection and psychological factors have been proved to induce group cooperation.In the public goods game scenario,the establishment of a complex behavior model that can show individual interests and cooperation is the greatest contribution of experimental economics to social cooperation research.In the field of public good provision,traditional economic theory always makes negative conclusions on the basis of the hypothesis that all behaviors are completely selfish.However,this is not necessarily consistent with the actual decision-making situation.This is because people make decisions based on the interaction of mind and emotion.The research methods of traditional economics generally adopt the empirical means of statistical data.Due to the limited amount of data,excessive sample noise and the inability to express the inner relationship between psychological factors and cooperation,the further in-depth study of cooperation is limited.The emergence of experimental economics solves these problems.There are two new trends in the theory and practice of public goods supply,along with the development of economy and society.The pattern of co-existence of public goods provided by the government and private providers is becoming increasingly apparent,and the marketization trend of public goods supply is increasingly obvious.Through the continuous upgrading of the supply structure of public goods and the innovation of the mode of supply and organization,the division and cooperation between the government mechanism and the market mechanism in the supply of public goods has been deepened,which makes it more urgent to solve the problem of the low efficiency of the supply of public goods.Traditional mechanism design theory focuses on mechanism design itself,while leader in public game is a useful supplement to traditional mechanism design theory.The leader's decision not only has an important influence on its followers' public goods supply,but also can release the signal of cooperation or non-cooperation to the followers through its first dynamic advantage.Through the diffusion of information,the level of cooperation and operation efficiency of the whole industry will be increased,and the incentive effect of the leader can be made better by adding appropriate punishment measures.Giving full play to the role of leaders is an important way to solve the shortage of public goods.The main motivation of this paper is the incentive mechanism,the nature of action and consequences of actions within and outside the organization.On the basis of theoretical analysis,this paper develops an experimental program based on the z-Tree platform of University of Zurich by experimental economics.A series of comparative experiments on voluntary contribution mechanism and leader supply mechanism have been designed?The effects of different mechanism design on the supply of public goods and the level of individual income were investigated,and the improvement of these mechanisms on the cooperative level of the subjects was compared,and the role of leader factors in the voluntary supply of public goods was also discussed.Through the analysis of the experimental data,we explore the behavior characteristics of the subjects,test the feasibility of the social supply of public goods,the role of the behavior of leaders on the supply of public goods,the influence of the generation of leaders on the supply level of public goods,and try to find the public goods supply mechanism suitable for the national conditions of our country.Explaining the evolution of cooperative behavior and maintaining the stability of cooperative system has always been a problem that sociologists and economists are trying to solve.The influence of gender on the choice of game strategy is a very important content in the study of cooperative behavior evolution.The evolutionary perspective holds that the choice of strategies by men or women depends on the specific environment.This paper,following the hot spot of international academic research,studies the differences in the cooperation between male and female in the supply of public goods,and the experimental conclusions have a certain reference value on what measures should be adopted in real life to influence the behavior choice of male and female.This paper specifically designed three groups of comparative experiments,namely,leading by example and leading by word experiment,the random appointing leader and the endogenous election leader experiment,the same-sex game and the mixed sex game group experiment.On the basis of the experimental paradigm of repeated public goods,the research shows that the leader's role in collective cooperation has certain persistence,and the list style leaders have a significant effect on the improvement of the group cooperation level.The influence leading by word on group cooperation is not weaker than the group of leading by example.However,leaders often violate promises,so leading by example are more effective than verbal promises.The results of the second groups showed that there was no significant difference in the impact of random appointment leaders and election endogeneity leaders on group cooperative behavior,but it was not negligible that whether the volunteers volunteered to be a leader would have an impact on the behavior tendency of the leaders.If the elected leader is contrary to the wishes of the subject,the election effect will increase the level of cooperation in the early stage of the experiment,but with the increase of the number of experimental rounds,the influence of the incentive factor is becoming less and less.The results show that the willingness of subjects to become leaders is also endogeneity.In the same gender group,male tend to cooperate.In mixed gender group,female tend to cooperate.Due to the presence of male subjects,the overall cooperation rate of the mixed sex group is higher than that of the female group.Although the tendency of cooperation between men and women is influenced by the external environment,men generally show stronger cooperation motives than females.Long term evolution makes male and female form psychological characteristics that adapt to their own sex,and choose different strategies to maximize their own interests according to different environments.This paper also studies the influence of heterogeneity of social preferences on the degree of group cooperation.By means of strategy,donation experiment and psychological measure,the subjects are divided into the free rider,the conditional cooperator and the absolute cooperator.The absolute cooperators' willingness to cooperate is the highest,but the proportion is the least.The proportion of free riders is slightly higher than that of absolute cooperator,but their willingness to cooperate is very low.Most of the subjects are conditional cooperator,and they have a certain willingness to cooperate to adjust their level of cooperation by observing and predicting the behavior of the other groups of people.In the case of social preference heterogeneity,compared with voluntary supply mechanism,the introduction of leader mechanism can better improve group cooperation level.Whether the partners and free riders are leaders or followers,the public goods donation level of both sides has been significantly improved.Leader's public goods experiment is of great importance in improving the supply system of public goods.In traditional economics,it is difficult to measure the role of the leader,and the method of experimental economics can make a comprehensive and clear investigation of the influence of the leader.In conclusion,we discuss the influence of the voluntary supply mechanism and the leader supply mechanism on the supply level of public goods by means of experimental methods.It has great theoretical and practical significance to explore the supply mechanism of public goods suitable for the national conditions of our country.Though the design experiment is far from fully simulating the real public goods supply problem,it can still reflect the influence of leaders on public goods donation behavior to a certain extent.