Respect, Ethics, As The Threshold

"Respect" is undoubtedly one of the most pivotal moral words in the modernsociety. People's answers to and convictions about "what to respect", "why torespect'and "how to respect" not only convey their moral position and claim, but inno small measure bear their everyday moral opinions and widespread commonunderstanding of ethics. However, what "respect" implies morally has remainedconceptually factually elusive, and in an era of diverse values like ours, more andmore prescriptive connotations that it is endowed with are no less than internallyconsistent.Deploying related studies at home and abroad, especially available discussions bycontemporary western scholars, this dissertation attempts to define the concept ofrespect in its most general sense, and explore thoroughly from a historicalperspective its moral implications which unfold and are elucidated in the horizon ofethics, and then reveal its developmental trend via rethinking the historical originand the contemporary situation of the modern idea of respect. According to theinherent logic and historical development of the concept of respect, the main contentof this paper is arranged into the following four parts:First of all, Respect is, most generally, a subject's response to an object, whichinvolves the subject's paying attention to, perceiving and valuing the object from acertain perspective, and consequently acting in some appropriate way. It is acomplex "way-of-being-toward-something", in which there are cognitive, affective,conative, valuational and behavioral dimensions. And this brings about no other thanthe fact that there are different kinds and usages of respect. At the same time, none ofthese different types of respect, so far as it is in accordance with the most generaldefinition, contains potentially no moral implication. As suggested by its derivation,respect means "to look back at" or "to look again", viz. a frame of mind or a mode ofconduct, which exactly indicates that man as a moral being is different from ananimal.Although forgotten and neglected in the modern society, this virtuous connotation that respect bears in its most general sense, that is to say, the moral consequence ofbeing modest, and hence becoming dignified that it renders on the part of the subject,is of great significance in a traditional society. Therefore, even if the concept ofrespect itself did not turn up, we can find in the literature of traditional ethics theformulation and accounts of taking it as a virtue: confronted with an object of respect,one should rethink himself or herself, be aware of his or her ignorance andlimitedness, thereby cultivate and preserve a character and conduct of seriousness,prudence, humility and reverence, rather than being arbitrary, arrogant,self-conceited and indifferent. As the traditional conception of virtue wasmarginalized, this understanding of respect as a vitue has been interpreted by modernethicists a moral feeling that urges one to obey moral rules. And as a result from it,the normative meaning of the concept of respect came into view.If to understand respect as a vitue is owing to the fact that "respect I feel about orshow for something means that I ought to maintain a good character ", then tounderstand it as a norm is due to the fact that "respect you should give to somethingis indispensable to an ideal moral order". Thus the normative meaning of respectthough inherits partly its traditional virtuous connotation, involves in a great degreewhat is prescripted strictly in the horizon of modern ethics. As normativeunderstanding and constructing that is typical, as well as the most lasting, Kant gavethree accounts of respect for persons, namely, recognition respect that alwaystreating a person as an end in itself, appraisal respect that given some persons astheir due tribute, and respect as moral maxim and duty. On these accounts, Kantpromoted a kind of normative respect for persons to be the moral basic principle,which develops into the ethics of respect that has had universal influence on themodern social life.Although the ethics of respect (for persons) origining from Kant affordsundeniable insight into morality, and has indeed furthered moral progress, itsdisregard of persons' identities and differences as the objects of resepct, and itsanthropocentricism that claims only persons are respectworthy, confront it inevitablywith the query by multiculturalists and the challenge from moral extensionism in thepresent age. The contemporary situation that the ethics of respect finds itself in isdeliberated carefully in the last part of this paper. And that will demonstrate thelimitation of the understanding paradigm that taking respect as a norm in the horizonof modern ethics cannot adopt nonpersons as the objects of respect, and display the possibility and necessity of renewing the traditional understanding, that is to say,resuming the virtuous connotation of the concept of respect.So far as the numerous moral problems the concept of respect is concerned, theinvestigation heretofore in this dissertation is surely far from enough and complete,and yet involves no theoretical proposition. Notwithstanding, it is truly admitted thatthe paper's philosophical analysis and historical examination will redound to oursensitivity to the richness of the moral word of "respect", and help to break up theparochial understanding of it in the modern society, and withhold it from beingincreasingly empty and impotent, even becoming into the expression of individualfeeling and inclination.