Analysis On Virtual Enterprise’s Expected Revenue Sharing Based On Fuzzy Cooperative Game

The virtual enterprise is built on the basis of interest, and each member enterprise needs a reasonable measure of the contribution of resources. Before the cooperation, the tasks, rights and obligations that completed by the member companies need to be finalized in the prior contract. In this process, member enterprise needs multi inspection and communication to determine the cooperation strategy and distribution strategy of their own. This is a matter of multiple-person cooperation game.In the past, most of the literature used the classical cooperative game to deal with the problem of strategic alliances revenue sharing. However, the classic cooperative game based on two assumptions: ①Players participated fully in a particular Alliance. ②The people in the game before cooperation fully knew the different cooperation strategies expected return. But the reality of league income distribution problems often do not meet the above two assumptions. The reality is that members may be in multiple alliance of different participation rate and they do not know the benefits of different strategies of cooperation.The main results are as followsFirst, the fuzzy characteristics of influence factors in virtual enterprise’s revenue sharing are extracted. Fuzziness of virtual enterprise income share is studied through the empirical. Fuzziness mainly displays in participation rate and earnings. In this context, fuzzy cooperative game theory is innovatied.Second, revenue sharing of the virtual enterprise is researched with the fuzzy participation. The essence of such problems is the problems of solving cooperative games with fuzzy coalition.In this cooperative games, participation of a player is fuzzy. Based on the previous studies, we define the payment functions and Shapley value of fuzzy numbers with integral expression Chqouet forms based on the fuzzy structure element theory. Then we define fuzzy Shapley value expression generated by the linear structure. Therefore, payment function and Shapley is analytic expressed and the results are continuous functions. They are superior to exact numbers and interval numbers.Third, revenue sharing of the virtual enterprise is researched with the fuzzy expected benefits. The essence of such problems is the problems of solving cooperative games with fuzzy expected benefits. Fuzzy mathematical method is used to study cooperative games. Then we apply the fuzzy structured element theory to analyze cooperative games with fuzzy expected’ benefits. The membership function of the fuzzy Shapley value can get analytic expression. After comparing the results of different research methods, the model not only ensures the continuity of the membership function, but also gives the possibility of each number in the range. This method can provide more accurate information for managers.Fourth, this thesis expand benefits and participation as fuzzy numbers based on the Choquet integral and give the definition of cooperative games with dual fuzzy factors fuzzy Shapley value on GFF(N). Then authors apply the fuzzy structured element theory to analyze fuzzy Cooperative games with dual fuzzy factors. The membership function of the fuzzy Shapley value can get analytic expression. It can be seen that this method and conclusion are easy to master and promote. Fuzzy cooperative game theory can be applied more widely to real life.The improved models are applied to virtual enterprise income distribution. Results of three cases in real application are given. According the results managers can decide whether to participate in the league or make suitable composite strategy.