Study On Container Port Competition Equilibrium Analyses And Macro-control Method Based On Game Theory

Oligarch monopoly and incomplete competition behavior in port network leads that each port department only considers its own benefit and maximizes it. Meanwhile, because of scale economic benefit, constantly enlarging port scale becomes the most important development strategy of majority of container ports. On the other hand, the demand of port market in a certain period is relatively fixed, so scale structure conflict of container port market is engendered. Based on market holistic competition mechanism and market equilibrium, in this paper, container port competition and government macro-control from the macro angle of region and network are investigated. An effective method is propoesed for the balance of self-operation for microcosmic market of port.In order to seek optimal network layout of port capacity, obtain maximal social benefit and realize rational allocation of social resources, an effective policy control is implemented via no over-interference but guide microcosmic market's competition,In this dissertation, the author firstly summarizes the origin and development of industrial economics, makes a systematic exposition to the research methods about competition and monopoly in theory of industrial organization and the development situation of China's container port, and points out the limitations and shortcomings of traditional research method. Second, the author demonstrates driving mechanism of inducing scale concentration based on rational market competition mechanism, analyzes structure illogicality of container port, and researches competitive strategy and behavier of port enterprises in the market of non-perfect competition under the definite assume conditions by establishing corresponding game models. The conclusions are, under the case of oligarch competition, port enterprises could make full use of game model under complete information, to obtain the maximum benefit according to the optimal strategies equilibrium solutions of scale game in each stage. Thirdly, we establish index system and evaluation model of container port competition power by utilizing analytic hierarchy process, calculate the probability of the city choose port and hinterland scope of node based on p-choice model in an area of covering with container ports network, improve the defects in original algorithm and make numerical test examples. At last, in order to to provide reference for government's decision-making, we study the relationship between government macro-control and port scale construct game based on correlative theory of economics, put forward the conception of decision-making function, and present theory and application framework to quantify this macro-control question based on decision-making function.